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Abstract 
 
Using new time-series data for the size of the Canadian underground economy, we examine the 
relationship between unreported and measured GDP in that country. Granger causality tests are 
conducted, with a proper allowance for the non-stationarity of the data. We find that there is clear 
evidence of such causality from measured GDP to “hidden” output, but only very mild evidence 
of Granger causality in the reverse direction. This result supports similar evidence for New 
Zealand reported by the first author, and has several interesting policy implications. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, there has been a significant resurgence of interest in the underground economy in 
various countries. This has been driven in part by the recognition that the size of the underground 
economy is growing in both absolute and relative terms internationally. There is now 
comprehensive evidence that the hidden economy, expressed as a percentage of measured GDP 
for comparative purposes, has been growing quite steadily over the past two or three decades in 
virtually every country that has been studied. For example, Schneider and Enste (2000) document 
this phenomenon for sixty-seven countries. A very detailed analysis of this situation in New 
Zealand is discussed by Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c); and similar evidence for 
Canada is provided by Giles and Tedds (2002). 
 
The growth in the underground economy and tax evasion can been explained by the 
corresponding increase in effective tax rates in many countries, rising regulatory activity in 
certain jurisdictions, and a general decline in ethical standards (e.g., Caragata and Giles 2000; 
Giles and Caragata, 2001; Schneider and Enste, 2000). Demographic trends and an increase in the 
number of home-based businesses are also important factors in countries such as Canada. 
 
In this context it is interesting to investigate the nature of the relationship between unreported and 
measured output. A rise in the relative size of the underground economy (i.e., in the ratio of 
hidden to measured GDP) is the net result of the underground economy growing at a faster rate 
than GDP. This raises important policy questions, such as: to what extent is the flight 
underground retarding measured economic growth? What is the connection between the 
measured and unmeasured business cycles?  Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a) has previously 
addressed these questions in relation to the New Zealand underground economy.  
 
In this paper we use new time-series data on the Canadian underground economy compiled by 
Giles and Tedds (2002) to examine the causal relationship between the underground and reported 
economies in that country. The results reported below provide strong support for the conclusions 
reached by Giles (1997a). 
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II. DATA ISSUES 
 
Following earlier work by Tedds (1998), recent research by Giles and Tedds (2002) has used 
MIMIC modelling1 to generate annual values for the relative size of the Canadian underground 
economy for the period 1976 to 1995. These appear in Figure 1. The series2 ranges in value from 
approximately 3.5% of measured GDP in 1976 to around 16% in 1995. The latter figure accords 
well with the results of Schneider and Enste (2000). Using a different approach to ours, they 
obtain a figure of about 15% of GDP in the mid-1990’s. Using the actual real measured GDP data 
for Canada over this period3 we can then obtain a corresponding real dollar series for the 
underground economy (UE), which ranges from about C$13Billion in 1976 to about C$96Billion 
in 1995, in constant 1986 dollar terms4. Visually, the data for measured and underground real 
output each appear non-stationary, so care has to be taken when testing for Granger causality 
between them. 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
In order to apply our chosen procedure for testing for Granger causality, namely that suggested by 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we need to determine the maximum order of integration of each of 
the series being studied. To do this we have used5 the standard “augmented” Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (e.g., Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981; Said and Dickey, 1984). Dods and Giles (1995) 
show that the default method of obtaining the augmentation level, p, in the SHAZAM (1997) 
package is a good choice for samples of our size if one wishes to avoid a finite-sample size-
distortion in the implementation of these tests. With respect to the inclusion of drift and/or trend 
terms in the ADF regression, we follow the sequential strategy of Dolado et al. (1990), which is 
also used in this context by Giles (1997a). To test that the series xt is I(1), against the alternative 
that xt is I(0) (or stationary) the level of augmentation, p, is determined as above, in the context of 
the following full ADF regression: 
 
Δxt = α +βt + γxt-1 + θ1Δxt-1 + .......+ θpΔxt-p + εt       .  
 (1) 
 
We test Ho: γ = 0 vs. HA: γ < 0 using the Dickey-Fuller "t" test (denoted "tdt" below) and 
MacKinnon's (1991) critical values. If H0 is rejected, we conclude that xt is stationary, otherwise 
we test H0: β = γ = 0, using the "F-test" (denoted "Fut" below) of Dickey and Fuller (1981). A 
rejection implies that xt is I(1); otherwise we remove the trend from (1) and test H0: γ = 0 vs. HA: 
 3
γ < 0. The ADF "t-statistic" is denoted "td". If we cannot reject H0, we test H0: α = γ = 0 using the 
"F-test" (denoted "Fud" below) of Dickey and Fuller (1981). A rejection implies that xt is I(1); 
otherwise we remove the drift term and re-estimate (1), and test H0: γ = 0 vs. HA: γ < 0. This "t-
statistic" is denoted "t" in Table 1. A rejection suggests that xt is I(0), while failing to reject 
uggests that xt is I(1).  
a) finding for New Zealand. Its economic implications are discussed below in 
Section IV.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
I. MODEL ESTIMATION AND GRANGER CAUSALITY 
edom equal to the number of “zero restrictions”, 
even though GDP and UE are non-st
s
 
As some economic time-series are I(2), we test I(3) against I(2) (applying the above analysis to 
the doubly-first-differenced data); then if we reject I(3) we test I(2) against I(1) (using the first-
differences of the data), and we finally test I(1) against I(0), if necessary (following Dickey and 
Pantula, 1987). The results of this analysis appear6 in Table 1, where we see that real GDP is I(1), 
but we cannot reject the hypothesis that UE is I(2). This is an interesting result, and is contrary to 
Giles’ (1997
 
I
 
We have used a two-equation VAR model, and the methodology of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
to identify the direction(s) of any causality between GDP and UE. Care must be taken in the way 
that this testing is performed if the usual test statistics are to have standard asymptotic 
distributions in the presence of non-stationary data such as ours.  Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
show that this standard asymptotic theory holds if we determine the lags in the VAR equations in 
the usual way, but then we add extra lags of the variables, equal in number to the maximum 
suspected order of integration. In our case, this means adding two more lags of each variable in 
each equation. We then estimate the system, and we can apply the usual Wald test to see if the 
coefficients of the lagged UE variables (excluding the extra ones) are jointly zero in the GDP 
equation. Similarly, we test if the coefficients of the lagged GDP variables (excluding the extra 
ones) are jointly zero in the UE equation. In each case, the Wald test statistic will be 
asymptotically Chi Square, with degrees of fre
ationary. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
Using the Schwartz Criterion and Akaiake’s Information Criterion to determine the lag lengths, 
we have constructed two-equation VAR models for the following three cases: no constant and no 
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trend; constant but no trend; and constant and linear trend. The results of estimating these models 
by maximum likelihood, using the SHAZAM (1997) package, appear in Table 2. We see there 
that the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test supports our use of systems estimation, rather 
than single-equation estimation. The positive coefficients on the lagged GDP variables in the UE 
equation suggest that increases (decreases) in the measured economy induce variations of a 
similar sign in the underground economy. Similarly, the negative coefficients on the lagged UE 
variables in the GDP equation suggest that increases (decreases) in the underground economy 
duce variations of the opposite sign in the measured economy. The economic implications of 
ence that the causality is bi-directional. (Only in the constant/trend model do we reject 
the absence of causality from UE to GDP at the 10% significance level, but not at the 5% or 1% 
levels.)  
[Table 3 About Here] 
 
easured and hidden economies will be stimulated 
 the same direction. It then remains to determine whether the relative size of the underground 
economy, (UE/GDP), will increase or decrease. 
in
this are explored in Section IV below. 
 
Of course, this presupposes the existence of causality between these variables. The results of 
applying the Wald tests for Granger non-causality to the “augmented” VAR models appear in 
Table 3, together with various diagnostic tests, suitably modified to allow for their application in 
the context of a jointly-estimated system7. All of these tests have only asymptotic justification, so 
we used “bootstrap” simulation, with 5,000 replications, to obtain their exact p-values. These are 
also reported in Table 3, and on this basis the diagnostic tests suggest that the VAR models on 
which the Wald-testing is based are quite well specified. We also see there is strong evidence of 
causality from GDP to UE. (We clearly reject non-causality in this direction.) There is only very 
mild evid
III. Economic Implications 
 
These causality results accord entirely with those of Giles (1997a) for the New Zealand 
underground and measured economies. The clear evidence of causality from measured to hidden 
output poses an interesting dilemma for policy-makers. If expansionary monetary or fiscal 
policies are used to stimulate measured output, then it seems that this will also have a subsequent 
effect on the size of the underground economy. The positive coefficients on the lagged GDP 
variables in the UE equations in our VAR models reported in Table 2 imply that this effect will 
also be an expansionary one. That is, both the m
in
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 Taking up this last point, the results of Caragata and Giles (2000) and Giles and Caragata (2001) 
for New Zealand show clearly that an expansionary fiscal policy (through a reduction in the 
effective tax rate) will lead to a reduction in (UE/GDP), ceteris paribus. Giles and Tedds (2002) 
show that the same is true in the Canadian case. In essence, the size of the hidden economy 
shrinks, and measured GDP increases. The latter arises partly because of the direct stimulation of 
this fiscal policy, and partly because previously at least some unmeasured output is now 
measured.  In fact government revenue can also rise (notwithstanding the tax-cut), given the 
increase in the tax-base. The propensity for this to occur depends, of course, on the magnitude of 
e cut, and the initial effective tax rate.  
, one would 
nticipate an indirect link between monetary policy changes and unrecorded output. 
onomy Initiative” to increase compliance enforcement apparently has 
et with limited success 9.  
th
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is virtually no corresponding empirical evidence available 
regarding the relationship between monetary policy changes and the relative size of the 
underground economy8. The analysis of Langfeldt (1985) suggests that changes in the money 
supply appear to have little direct effect on the hidden economy. However, as in several other 
countries, monetary policy in Canada is now directed towards maintaining inflation within a 
narrow band, and there is empirical evidence (e.g., Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984; Giles, 
1999c; Tedds, 1998) that inflation is a causal factor of underground activity. So
a
 
The apparent absence of any significant causality from the underground economy to measured 
output is also interesting from a policy perspective. The negative coefficients on the lagged UE 
variables in the GDP equations, as reported in Table 2, suggest that an increase in the hidden 
economy may have a negative impact on measured economic growth. However, these coefficient 
estimates are generally insignificant. The absence of causality is consistent with the observed 
concurrent growth of both of these sectors in Canada in recent years. It also suggests that policy 
changes such as more stringent penalties for tax evasion, intended to combat the growth of the 
underground economy, will not necessarily by themselves stimulate measured output. This is a 
serious issue in the Canadian context, especially given the fact that recent attempts by Revenue 
Canada’s  “Underground Ec
m
 
Finally, the results of the unit root testing in Table 1 imply that the Canadian underground and 
measured economies cannot be cointegrated as the series are integrated of different orders10. That 
 6
is, in the face of a shock to one of these series, there is no linear long-run equilibrating 
mechanism that will prevent these two economic variables from moving further and further apart 
over time. From a policy perspective, this has serious implications. For example, in the context of 
the recent and present “tax revolt” in that country, this means that any adverse growth effects 
arising from the increased tendency of agents to “go underground” are unlikely to be short-lived, 
nless direct policy actions (such as a reduction in the tax burden) are taken. 
V. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
r causality from the former to the latter. There is only slight evidence of 
verse causality.   
policy and the underground economy 
main to be explored empirically in the Canadian context. 
NTS 
f the authors, and should not be attributed to their employers or 
 the Canadian Tax Foundation. 
 
u
 
I
 
In this paper we have used new time-series data for the Canadian underground economy to 
explore some of the basic linkages between measured and hidden output in that country from the 
mid 1970’s to the mid 1990’s. Many of our results are strikingly similar to those that are available 
for the New Zealand underground economy. We find that there is no evidence of a long-run 
equilibrating mechanism linking the measured and unrecorded sectors, but that there is strong 
evidence of Grange
re
 
Fiscal and monetary shocks will impact on both measured and underground output, and the net 
effect on the relative size of the underground sector is ambiguous, a priori. Other work by the 
authors (Giles and Tedds, 2002) addresses the relationship between changes in the effective tax 
rate and the relative size of the Canadian underground economy. A clear positive such 
relationship is identified. The linkages between monetary 
re
 
 
 ACKNOWLEDGEME
 
This research was funded by a grant from the Canadian Tax Foundation. The results and views 
expressed in this paper are those o
to
 7
Table 1.    ADF unit root test results a 
 
T p tdt Fut td Fud t Outcome 
 
GDP 
 
H0  :  I(2)  18 0 -2.78 3.87 -2.87 4.11 n.a. Reject I(2) 
[HA  : I(1)]  
H0  : I(1)  19 0 -1.64 1.38 -0.56 11.31 n.a. I(1) 
[HA : I(0)] 
UE 
              
H0  :  I(2)  15 3 -1.03 1.42 -1.64 1.40 -0.22 I(2) 
[HA  : I(1)]  
H0  : I(1)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
[HA : I(0)] 
 
Note: a T is the sample size; the other notation is defined in the text. 
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Table 2.    Estimation of the basic VAR Models a, b 
 
No Constant, No Trend  Constant, No Trend  Constant, Trend 
 
GDP Equation 
 
Constant n.a. (n.a.)  3884 (0.04)   -3*107 (-4.08) 
Trend  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)   13660 (4.51) 
GDP-1  1.037 (56.15)  1.028 (3.71)   1.024 (5.40) 
UE-1  -0.001 (-0.78)  -0.003 (-0.22)   -0.020 (-1.82) 
UE-2  n.a. (n.a.)  0.002 (0.21)   -0.006 (-0.78) 
R2  0.962   0.962    0.983 
 
UE Equation 
 
Constant n.a. (n.a.)  -4*106 (-1.86)   -5*108 (-3.35) 
Trend  n.a. (n.a.)  n.a. (n.a.)   268640 (3.33) 
UE-1  0.970 (24.34)  0.697 (4.58)   0.173 (0.80) 
GDP-1  1.276 (2.78)  10.247 (1.73)   12.943 (2.72) 
GDP-2  n.a. (n.a.)  2.526 (0.49)   1.000 (0.20)   
R2  0.986   0.988    0.993 
 
BP-LM c 7.50   8.08    3.79 
[p-value] [0.006]   [0.002]    [0.052] 
 
Note: a These are the chosen specifications before the extra lags are added for the Toda-Yamamoto 
 causality-testing procedure. 
 b Asymptotic “t-values” appear in parentheses. 
 c BP-LM is the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for a diagonal error covariance matrix. 
 (The test statistic is asymptotically  χ21 in a 2-equation system.)
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Table 3.    Causality tests, and diagnostics for the “augmented” models a, b 
                                                                                                                                                              
Equation Waldc JB LM1 LM2 LM3 LM4  F1 F2 F3 
 (χ22) (χ21) (χ21) (χ21) (χ21)  (χ22) (χ24) (χ26) 
                              
No Constant, No Trend 
 
GDP  0.04 6.15 0.15 0.47 0.52 0.30  3.39 10.33 40.67 
(0.83) (0.05) (0.44) (0.32) (0.31) (0.38)  (0.18) (0.04) (0.00) 
[0.84] [0.14] [0.92] [0.71] [0.62] [0.82]  [0.52] [0.53] [0.36] 
UE  0.12 2.15 0.16 0.16 0.97 0.56  2.74 10.83 187.45 
(0.74) (0.34) (0.44) (0.43) (0.17) (0.29)  (0.25) (0.03) (0.00) 
[0.74] [0.22] [0.92] [0.92] [0.28] [0.59]  [0.59] [0.53] [0.04] 
                               
Constant, No Trend 
 
GDP  1.08 2.89 0.40 0.49 0.61 0.07  6.88 12.73 63.72 
(0.58) (0.24) (0.34) (0.31) (0.27) (0.47)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
[0.35] [0.06] [0.73] [0.67] [0.56] [0.96]  [0.39] [0.62] [0.50] 
UE  13.24 0.21 0.86 0.09 0.71 0.34  24.04 41.28 931.76 
(0.00) (0.90) (0.20) (0.46) (0.24) (0.37)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
[0.01] [0.19] [0.37] [0.95] [0.48] [0.77]  [0.08] [0.21] [0.05] 
 
Constant, Trend 
 
GDP  5.32 11.24 0.82 1.61 0.15 1.04  5.36 30.61 30339.5 
(0.07) (0.00) (0.21) (0.05) (0.44) (0.15)  (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) 
[0.07] [0.08] [0.34] [0.06] [0.91] [0.20]  [0.53] [0.41] [0.03] 
UE  15.14 0.63 1.20 1.18 0.38 1.24  9.37 22.12 116.65 
(0.00) (0.73) (0.12) (0.12) (0.35) (0.11)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
[0.01] [0.73] [0.16] [0.17] [0.73] [0.14]  [0.38] [0.55] [0.56] 
 
Note: a Asymptotic p-values appear in parentheses, and bootstapped finite-sample p-values appear in 
 brackets, below the test statistic values. 
 b The diagnostic tests relate to the VAR with the extra lagged variables added for the Toda-
 Yamamoto causality-testing procedure. 
c The Wald causality test statistic is asymptotically χ21 in the no drift/no trend case, and 
asymptotically χ22 in the other two cases.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. “MIMIC” denotes “Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes”. This type of structural 
modelling has been popularized in the social sciences by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993), 
and it has also been used to model the underground economy by other authors such as 
Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), Aigner et al. (1986), Loayza (1996), Schneider and 
Enste (2000), and Giles (1999c). 
2. The data are available from the authors on request. 
3. We have used annual series D14442 from the Statistics Canada CANSIM database. 
4. This equates to a Canadian underground economy of about $130Billion in 1995 in 
current-dollar terms 
5. The conclusions reached here are not altered if the tests of Kwiatowski et al. (1992) are 
used instead. 
6. To conserve space we have omitted results relating to the tests of I(3) against I(2) as they 
had no bearing on our conclusions. 
7. JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test; LM1 to LM4 are Lagrange Multiplier tests for 
serial independence against simple AR or MA alternatives; F1 to F3 are asymptotic Wald 
versions of the DeBenedictis and Giles (1998) FRESET test, using one to three sine and 
cosine functions of the predicted dependent variable in their construction. All of these 
tests have only asymptotic validity here, as lagged dependent variables appear as 
regressors. 
8. However, see Giles (1999b) for a discussion of the role of hidden income in the 
formulation of money-demand functions. 
9. The latest Report of the Auditor General of Canada (1999, Chap. 2) takes issue not only 
with the “return” that has been achieved on the resources allocated to the Underground 
Economy Initiative in recent years, but also on the way this return has been reported by 
Revenue Canada. 
10. Unit root tests have notoriously low power, so there a possibility that UE is really I(1) 
rather than I(2), and then the potential for cointegration exists. However, pursuing this 
possibility, we found that there was no evidence of cointegration using the standard 
Engle-Granger (1987) two-step approach. CRADF statistic values of –2.274 (–1.855) 
were obtained based on cointegrating regressions without (with a linear trend). 
 
